Striking at the Roots of Crime: The Impact of Social Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great Depression by Ryan S. Johnson et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
STRIKING AT THE ROOTS OF CRIME:










The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of James Heckman, Lawrence Katz, Lars
Lefgren, Paul Rhode, Koleman Strumpf, and an anonymous referee. We offer special thanks to Koleman
Strumpf for providing us with information on the extent to which Prohibition was repealed by local
governments and Paul Rhode who shared annual data on tax returns with us. Seminar participants
at the 2002 NBER Summer Institute, 2003 ASSA meetings, and the Universities of California-Davis,
California-Los Angeles, California-Riverside, and Utah provided insightful comments and advice.
Financial support has been provided by National Science Foundation Grants SBR-9708098, SES-
0080324, and SES-0214395. We are solely responsible for the views expressed in the article.
© 2007 by Ryan S. Johnson, Shawn Kantor, and Price V. Fishback. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Striking at the Roots of Crime: The Impact of Social Welfare Spending on Crime During the
Great Depression
Ryan S. Johnson, Shawn Kantor, and Price V. Fishback
NBER Working Paper No. 12825
January 2007, Revised March 2010
JEL No. H53,I38,K4,N31,N41
ABSTRACT
The Great Depression of the 1930s led contemporaries to worry that people hit by hard times would
turn to crime in their efforts to survive. Franklin Roosevelt argued that the unprecedented and massive
expansion in relief efforts “struck at the roots of crime” by providing subsistence income to needy
families. After constructing a panel data set for 81 large American cities for the years 1930 through
1940, we estimate the impact of relief spending by all levels of government on crime rates. The analysis
suggests that a ten percent increase in relief spending during the 1930s lowered property crime by
roughly 1.5 percent. By limiting the amount of free time for relief recipients, work relief was more
effective than direct relief in reducing crime. More generally, our results indicate that social insurance,
which tends to be understudied in economic analyses of crime, should be more explicitly and more







School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts
University of California, Merced







Tucson, AZ  85721
and NBER
pfishback@eller.arizona.edu  3 
Striking at the Roots of Crime: 




[T]hrough a broad program of social welfare, we struck at the very roots of crime 
itself....Our citizens who have been out of work in the last six years have not needed to 
steal in order to keep from starving.  Of course, when we instituted those [New Deal] 
activities we did not have in mind merely the narrow purpose of preventing crime.  
However, nobody who knows how demoralizing the effects of enforced idleness may 
be, will be inclined to doubt that crime prevention has been an important by-product of 
our effort to provide our needy unemployed citizens with the opportunity to earn by 
honest work at least the bare necessities of life. 
 
      Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 17, 1939
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I.  Introduction 
Social reformers during many periods in American history have suggested that social welfare 
spending offers one means of deterring crime by providing people with adequate resources so they have 
less incentive to turn to crime.  A large body of research on modern criminality suggests that increases in 
police spending and improvements in employment opportunities aid in reducing crime rates.
2  Yet, 
empirical analysis that carefully examines the relationship between crime rates and social welfare 
programs is largely missing from the economics literature.
3   During the 1930s there was dramatic 
variation across cities and over time in the economic shocks from the Depression and in the distribution 
of social welfare spending.  The period therefore offers a unique opportunity to examine the effect of 
social insurance on deterring crime during a major economic downturn when social welfare programs 
likely had the potential to have their greatest impact. 
 We assemble a new city-level panel data set covering the period from 1930 through 1940 to 
examine the degree to which relief spending “struck at the very roots of crime” during the Depression.  
The results suggest that crime rates were negatively related with overall relief spending and that work 
relief, by limiting the free time of relief recipients, did more to deter crime than did direct relief.   
   4 
II.  Relief Spending During the Great Depression 
During the 1930s the economy sunk into the depths of a Depression with double-digit 
unemployment.  There was widespread fear that the social and economic foundation of American society 
was crumbling.  Faith in the capitalist economy was shaken as millions of unemployed Americans 
quickly ran through their savings.  Some sought desperate means to provide for their family’s subsistence.   
Prior to 1932 the financial responsibility for relief to people in dire circumstances was centered squarely 
on local governments with some specific forms of aid from the state.  A number of cities provided shelter 
and food in almshouses, while some cities provided relatively small amounts of cash assistance and in-
kind aid to the poor.  Faith-based charities often distributed aid (Gruber and Hungerman 2007).  Private 
charities in a number of cities also helped administer local aid.  Most states offered mothers’ pensions for 
widows with children and workers’ compensation to injured workers and some offered old-age assistance 
and aid to the blind.  The federal government played almost no role in providing relief spending beyond 
some aid to veterans.
4  
In response to the rising unemployment rates shown in Table 1, average per capita spending on 
relief for public and private programs in 114 leading U.S. cities rose more than four-fold from $1.54 to 
$7.42 (in constant 1935 dollars) between 1930 and 1932.  State and local governments faced increasing 
problems in meeting their relief obligations, while private sources of funding were hit hard by the 
Depression.  State and local governments therefore sought assistance from the federal government.  
During the fall of 1932 the Hoover administration responded with $300 million in Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation loans to help some cities temporarily fund their relief budgets.   
Faced with national unemployment rates near 25 percent in 1933, the Roosevelt administration 
argued that the economy had become a national problem and thus the federal government should accept 
much greater responsibility for providing relief.  Between 1932 and 1934, the federal government took 
over the vast majority of relief provision, raising its share of total relief expenditures from 2 percent to 
78.9 percent (see Table 1).  The surge of federal financing nearly tripled per capita relief spending in 114 
major cities from $7.42 in 1932 to $19.70 in 1934 (1935 dollars), the first full year the federal New Deal   5 
was in operation.  Despite significant drops in the number of people unemployed or on work relief during 
the rest of the decade, the per capita spending in 1935 dollars exceeded $21 for the rest of the decade, 
peaking at over $28 when unemployment spiked again in 1938.  Following the practice of the period, we 
included emergency relief workers as unemployed.  These relief workers were only partially employed 
because the payments they received and the working time that was offered were limited, such that the 
typical family on relief during the 1930s received benefits that did not exceed 42 percent of annual 
manufacturing wages (see Table 1).   
Gruber and Hungerman (2007) show that the rise in federal relief spending crowded out religious 
based private charity during the 1930s.  The Baird (1942, 12 and 152) estimates of private charity for 114 
cities suggest a similar story.  As relief from all levels of government rose from $262 million in 1932 to a 
peak of $1.38 billion in 1938, private relief spending fell from its peak of $59 million in 1932 to $10.6 
million in 1938, below its 1930 level of $14.9 million (all monetary terms expressed in constant 1935 
dollars).  As a result, the private share of relief spending in the 114 cities fell from 27 percent in 1930 to 
18 percent in 1932 to less than 1 percent after 1935.    
Between July 1933 and June 1935 the primary federal relief agency was the Federal Emergency 
Relief Administration (FERA).  Federal FERA officials distributed funds to state governments through an 
opaque process in which the revealed distribution suggests that they paid attention to the level of 
economic distress in the state, the state’s entreaties to FERA administrators, the state’s own efforts to 
fund relief, and the political situation.
5  State governments then distributed the funds internally to local 
governments.  FERA offered both direct relief and work relief.
6  Direct relief included programs that had 
no specific work requirements and assistance was provided in cash or in-kind, including subsistence 
items, such as food, shelter, clothing and household necessities, or medical care and hospitalization.  
Work relief, as the name connotes, required a labor contribution in return for the government assistance.  
FERA set a series of broad guidelines for its programs, but relied heavily on state and local officials to 
administer them and to determine the appropriate amounts of relief that individuals would receive.  
Applicants for relief applied to local offices where officials met with them personally and determined   6 
their eligibility for relief based on a “budget-deficit” principle.  Local officials calculated the difference 
between the family’s total income and a hypothetical budget for a family of that size and used the deficit 
to determine the family’s direct relief benefits or the amount that would be paid for work on a FERA 
project.  The amount of relief actually distributed to a family in many cases fell short of the budget-deficit 
if FERA funds in the local area were limited, as local officials sometimes decided to stretch their limited 
resources by funding more relief cases at less generous amounts. 
In response to a harsh winter and high levels of unemployment, FERA activities were 
supplemented temporarily by the Civil Works Administration (CWA) work relief program from 
November 15, 1933, through March 1934.  Large numbers on the FERA relief rolls were transferred to 
CWA employment, where they received wages that were not based on the budget-deficit principle, but on 
prevailing local market wages.  At its peak the CWA employed four million workers for a short period of 
time.
7 
In mid-1935 the Roosevelt administration redesigned the federal government’s role in providing 
relief.  The federal government continued to provide work relief for the unemployed who were 
“employable” through the Works Progress Administration (WPA), but returned much of the responsibility 
for direct relief of “unemployables” to state and local governments.  Applicants for aid were certified by 
state and local officials, who still considered a family’s budget-deficit when assessing its need for relief 
employment (Howard 1943, 380-403).  The federal WPA then hired people from the certified rolls.  
Dissatisfied with its lack of control over work relief under the FERA, the WPA was administered more 
centrally by the federal government.  Yet the WPA, like its FERA predecessor, faced a mixture of 
pressures as administrators decided how to distribute spending across the U.S.  State and local 
governments lobbied for funds and federal administrators appear to have paid attention to local economic 
distress and political necessities (see Howard 1943, Fleck 1999b, Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis 2003, 
Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor 2006).   
The federal government was not completely absent from providing direct relief to 
“unemployables,” as the Social Security Act of 1935 introduced joint state-federal versions of some   7 
earlier state programs, such as old-age assistance, aid to dependent children (replacing mothers’ 
pensions), and aid to the blind.  Beginning in 1936, federal grants-in-aid became available on a matching 
basis to states administering approved plans under the Social Security Act.  By the end of 1938, people in 
all but 8 states were receiving federal grants.  The shift in focus of the federal relief efforts and the 
eventual reductions in federal emergency work relief programs caused the federal share of the overall 
relief effort to slowly decline to 57 percent by 1940.   
III.  Estimating the Effects of Relief on Criminal Behavior 
To carry out the study, we have developed a new panel data set that enables us to measure the 
relationships between relief spending and seven major categories of crime for 81 cities from 1930 to 
1940.  In 1940 the cities in the sample accounted for 33 percent of the U.S. population and included every 
city with more than 300,000 people and all but 13 of the cities with more than 100,000 people (a listing of 
cities is shown in Appendix Table 1).  The U.S. Children’s Bureau published annual information on 
spending on public relief assistance by federal, state, and local governments and private relief assistance 
in 114 cities for 1929 through 1935 (Winslow 1937) and the U.S. Social Security Board updated the 
series and carried the data forward through 1940 (Baird 1942).  The public programs covered included 
general relief, the CWA, the FERA, the WPA, private assistance, and aid to dependent children (also 
mothers’ pensions), aid to the blind, and old age assistance.  The relief spending also includes private 
relief, which fell from 27 percent of total relief spending in 1930 to less than 1 percent by 1936 (Baird, 
1942, 12, 152). 
 In 1930 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
system which relied on local police reports of criminal activity in their respective cities.  Lawrence Rosen 
(1995, 228) describes the formation of the UCR as the “product of both a shared ideology and the 
structural interplay of social science, police, private philanthropy, and public administration in the 1920s.  
All these interests, to one degree or another, were committed to the major premise of ‘social 
progressivism’ . . . that science could improve the social health of the community.”  The UCR represented 
the first systematic attempt to statistically document crime at the local level and even today remains one   8 
of the main sources of data for social scientific research on crime.  Since we are examining the early days 
of the UCR, our sample is restricted to 81 cities that led the way in reporting crimes to the FBI.   
The FBI reported data on seven major crime categories:  murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, 
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.  We consider property 
crimes to be robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  The FBI defines robbery to be “the 
taking or attempt to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by 
force or threat of force violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.”  The FBI classifies robbery as a 
violent crime, but since it is committed to obtain something of value we have included it with property 
crimes for the purposes of testing whether New Deal relief mitigated theft “to keep from starving.”
8 
The quality of the data in the UCR likely varied over time as the system became more regimented 
and as cities became more accustomed to their new reporting roles.  The use of city fixed effects and city-
specific time trends should help control for any long-run systematic reporting disparities across cities and 
the use of year effects should help control for nationwide differences in reporting that varied from year to 
year.  Further, in an analysis of the quality of the UCR data in comparison with other modern sources, 
Boggess and Bound (1997) suggest that the trends for robbery, burglary, auto theft, and murder in the 
UCR tended to match the trends in other sources during the 1980s.  They indicate that crime reporting by 
victims and, hence, recording by police are more accurate when the crimes are more serious and 
committed by strangers.  Trends for rape, aggravated assault, and larceny tended to vary more widely 
across sources because larceny is the least serious of offenses and the assaults and rapes are much more 
likely to be perpetrated by non-strangers.   
By giving unemployed workers jobs and increasing the incomes of other poor Americans, relief 
spending presumably decreased the incentives to commit property crimes.  In Becker’s economics of 
crime framework, a higher income or higher wages increased the opportunity cost of committing crime.
9  
Work relief especially had the potential to effectively divert individuals’ time and interest away from 
property crime toward law-abiding activities.  The effects of relief spending on violent crimes like 
murder, aggravated assault and rape are less clear to the extent that these crimes are not driven by pure   9 
economic motives.  The relief spending potentially still might have reduced such crimes by reducing 
social stresses that might have contributed to more violent acts.   
Without controlling for other covariates, a simple difference-in-difference scatter plot suggests 
that cities with relatively larger increases in relief saw their crime rates decrease relatively more.  Figure 1 
plots the change in the average annual per capita property crime between 1930-1932 and 1933-1940 
against the change in the average annual per capita relief spending for the same periods.  The coefficient 
of the regression line in the figure is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The inverse 
relationship between crime and relief spending in this very simple analysis is striking in light of the fact 
that endogeneity would tend to bias the relationship in a positive direction. 
To control for the multiple attributes that may have influenced crime during the 1930s, we 
estimate the following regression equation: 
Cit = !0 + !1 Rit + !2 Xit + "t T + #i G + $i G t + %it           (1). 
Cit is the number of crimes per 100,000 people in city i in year t, R is either a single relief variable or a 
vector of spending on each relief program.   Xit is a vector (9 x 1) of correlates that also were likely to 
influence the crime rate.  T represents a vector (10 x 1) of year fixed effects to capture any shocks that 
were experienced by all cities in a specific year.  G is a vector (80 x 1) of city fixed effects that control for 
unobservable factors that did not vary over time, but varied across the cities.  The G vector of city fixed 
effects is also interacted with time t to develop a series of city-specific time trends.  The Greek symbols 
are coefficients or vectors of coefficients that match up with the correlates and correlate vectors.  The Xit 
vector of control variables contains per capita city police spending (in constant 1935 dollars) to control 
for changes in crime prevention activity.  A state employment index (equal to 100 in 1929) and city-
specific per capita retail sales (in constant 1935 dollars) are included to control for general economic 
activity and regular employment opportunities available in each city.  To help control for differences in 
the income distributions across cities, annual measures of the per capita number of federal income tax 
returns filed and the infant mortality rate are included.  Individual income tax filers earned more than 
$2,000 in taxable annual income and families filing taxes earned more than $5,000, levels of income   10 
reached by fewer than ten percent of households nationwide during the Depression.  Therefore, tax 
returns per capita should control for the share of the population in the upper tier of the income 
distribution.  The inclusion of infant mortality rates helps control for the share of population in the lower 
tier of the income distribution because infant mortality rates tend to be higher in lower-income 
households (Waldmann 1992 and Kaplan et. al. 1996). 
Prohibition, the ban of the sale of alcoholic beverages under the Eighteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution, from January 1920 through 1933 has often been associated with a rise in criminal activity in 
the 1920s and early 1930s.  When the national ban was ended in 1933, state and local governments made 
the decision about whether to continue their own bans.  We use a measure, created by Strumpf and 
Oberholzer-Gee (2002), indicating whether the county in which the city was located was “wet” and 
allowed the sale of alcohol.  This variable enables us to control for the impact of the relaxation of 
prohibition in each city.  In addition, two climate measures – the average monthly precipitation and the 
average monthly temperature in each city in each year – are added to control for any influences of 
temperature or precipitation on crime rates.
10  The city fixed effects control for time-invariant 
characteristics that vary across cities and might influence crime, including the local geography and 
unchanging legal climate and attitudes toward crime.
11  The year effects control for national-level shocks 
that affected all cities in that year, like changes in federal tax policy, the end of national Prohibition, 
technology shocks, and other factors.  The city-specific time trends control for varying crime trends in 
each city, which might have been the result of improvements in the reporting of crime as the city had been 
in the UCR system longer or trends in other factors that are not measured in the data.
12  The term %it is a 
random error term.   
Table 2 reports a series of estimates for per capita relief spending from ten equations with crimes 
per 100,000 people as the dependent variable.  There are four specifications for the total property crime 
rate, which includes the crime categories of larceny, burglary, robbery, and auto theft.  Coefficients for 
fixed effects estimations are reported for larceny, burglary, robbery, auto theft, murder, aggravated   11 
assault, and rape.  The t-statistic reported is based on robust standard errors that are clustered for each 
city.  The elasticities are estimated at the means for the sample.   
 Roosevelt’s claim that the relief programs had “struck at the roots of crime” is supported by the 
results in these specifications.  When the property crime rate was regressed on only per capita relief, the 
coefficient implies that an additional per capita dollar (1935$) of relief and public works spending was 
associated with a reduction in property crimes of 13.48 per 100,000 people.  The coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level or better in a two-tailed t-test (this will be the standard for statistical 
significance throughout the paper).  When other correlates, fixed effects and city-specific time trends are 
added to reduce omitted variable bias, the statistically significant coefficient estimate is roughly the same 
at -13.58 and statistically significant.  The elasticity of -0.154, estimated at the means in the sample, 
suggests that a one percent increase in per capita relief spending was associated with a 0.154 percent 
reduction in property crimes.  This elasticity is somewhat smaller than the elasticity of -0.2664 reported 
for per capita welfare spending by Zhang (1997) for 1987.  Zhang estimated the effect only for a cross-
section of U.S. states in 1987; therefore, he could not control for state and year fixed effects or for state-
specific time trends.     
A one-standard-deviation increase in per capita relief spending of $10.4 (1935$) during the 1930s 
was associated with a reduction of 140 property crimes per 100,000 people or 0.195 standard deviation of 
the property crime rate.  A final way to show the relationship is to consider the amount of relief spending 
that would have been needed to eliminate one property crime.  The coefficient estimate suggests that an 
expenditure of $7,420 (1935$), or $94 thousand in year 2000 dollars, would have led to a reduction of one 
property crime. 
Because the 1930s was the first decade in which the Uniform Crime Reports were compiled, and 
new cities were joining the system throughout the decade, the panel data set is unbalanced.  To examine 
whether the inclusion or exclusion of specific city-year observations influenced the results, we re-estimate 
the property crime fixed effect model with a balanced panel of cities that reported crimes in each year 
from 1930 through 1940.  The 35 cities in the balanced panel are marked with an asterisk in Appendix   12 
Table 1.  The balanced panel is focused more on mid-size cities with populations between 100,000 and 
300,000.  In the unbalanced panel 43 of the 81 cities have populations over 300,000 in 1940, while only 8 
of the 35 cities in the balanced panel are in that size class.  As seen in Table 2, the coefficient estimate in 
the balanced panel is more negative with an elasticity of -0.217.    
The remainder of Table 2 shows the estimates from regressions of each type of crime on the 
correlates, fixed effects, and city-specific time trends.  We focus on property crimes first because they are 
the ones most likely to be economically motivated.  The negative relationship between relief spending and 
property crime was present for all four categories of property crime, although the robbery coefficient 
estimate is not statistically significant.  An increase of per capita relief spending of one dollar (1935$; or 
$12.68 in 2000$) was associated with a reduction in crimes per 100,000 people of 7.47 larcenies, 5.59 
burglaries, 2.88 auto thefts, and 0.49 robberies. 
The remaining crimes in the table are violent crimes, which tend to be less motivated by 
economic considerations, although economic problems might have led to frustrations that contributed to 
the crimes.  An added dollar of per capita relief spending was associated with a reduction per 100,000 
people of 0.06 murders and 1.76 aggravated assaults, but an increase of 0.05 rapes.
13   
Another aspect of the relief spending to examine is the effect of different types of relief on 
criminal activity.  Economic theories of the trade-offs between work, leisure, and criminal activity predict 
that crime rates will have a stronger negative relationship with works programs.  Able-bodied men were 
generally not eligible for direct relief.  By providing unemployed men with the opportunity for work 
relief, the opportunity cost of committing a crime was increased.   Further, work requirements reduced the 
free time available to plot and commit crimes.  Direct relief should also have contributed to a decrease in 
property crime as the increase in non-labor income (the direct relief benefit) would have increased the 
potential criminal’s reservation wage or reservation return to committing a crime.
14  The results with 
relief spending split into direct and work relief spending are reported in Table 3. 
  The results confirm the prediction that works programs would have had a stronger negative 
relationship with crime than did direct relief.  Crime rates were more negatively related with work relief   13 
than with direct relief except in the  balanced panel with many fewer observations.  The relief programs’ 
coefficient estimates are negative for all but the rape category.  The work relief coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant for property crimes in the balanced and unbalanced panels, murder, and the 
property crime subcategories of larceny, burglary and auto theft.  Except for property crimes in the 
balanced panel, there are no statistically significant negative relationship between direct relief and any of 
the crime rates at the 10-percent level.  The coefficients are substantially more negative for the works 
spending than for direct relief in every equation but one.  In the property crime equation in the balanced 
panel of smaller cities, the work relief and direct relief coefficient estimates were nearly the same size.  In 
the full panel property crime equations the work relief coefficient estimate is about 2.6 times larger, in 
absolute value, than the direct relief coefficient.  For the specific crime categories, the ratio of the 
estimates of works coefficient to the direct relief coefficient range from 1.3 for aggravated assaults to 3.2 
for murders.  By diverting relief recipients’ time to work, the work relief programs appear to have 
reduced crime more than the direct relief programs.  The phrase “idle hands are the devil’s workshop” 
may have been an apt homily for relief programs. 
  During the late 1800s and early 1900s, a number of social reformers had argued that private 
charities and churches would do a better job than local governments of helping relief recipients “develop 
the better character” to leave the dole and become productive members of society.  In the late 1800s the 
Charity Organization Society took over the operation of outdoor relief in a number of cities in the United 
States on these grounds.
15  The relief data collected for the 1930s in Baird (1942) offer an opportunity to 
examine these claims.  In Table 4 we re-estimate the models with per capita relief broken into three parts:  
public work relief, public direct relief, and private relief.   The coefficient estimates for work relief 
change very little and the difference between the total direct relief coefficient estimates in Table 3 and 
those for public direct relief in Table 4 are very similar.  The private relief coefficient estimates are larger 
than the work relief coefficients in the property crime regressions with the different panels and in the 
murder rate regression.  However, only the private relief estimate in the murder rate regression is 
statistically significant.  The elasticities and one standard deviation effects for the private relief estimates   14 
are substantially smaller than for the estimates for the other types of relief because the mean and standard 
deviation for per capita private relief were substantially lower at 33 cents and 44 cents, respectively.   
 
Instrumental Variable Analysis 
  There still remains a possibility that the estimation procedure that includes the correlates and 
fixed effects has not fully controlled for endogeneity and simultaneity.  To the degree that the various 
levels of government used increases in crime rates as one of their signals of a greater need for relief 
spending, the simultaneity bias would have been positive for the relief spending coefficients.   The 
anticipated positive bias suggests that the relationships estimated in the fixed effects analyses in Tables 2, 
3, and 4 are smaller in absolute value than the true relationship.  There also may have been omitted 
variable bias to the extent that our proxies for poverty do not fully control for differences in poverty levels 
across cities.   Poverty levels were likely to have been positively correlated with both relief spending and 
with crime, which would impart a positive bias to the relief spending coefficients.    
  To examine these potential biases further, we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) approach.  
After controlling for the set of correlates in the analysis, the instrument must be correlated with relief 
spending but uncorrelated with the estimated error term of the crime regression.  Since the estimation uses 
data from a panel of cities with year and city fixed effects, the instruments must vary over time as well as 
across cities.  To achieve this end, we multiplied a cross-sectional variable that measures a factor 
influencing Roosevelt’s re-election strategy by a time series variable that captures national fluctuations in 
per capita relief spending to create an interaction term that varies across time and space.   The cross-
sectional political strategy variable is a measure of the city’s loyalty to the Democratic party in 
presidential elections.  We use the mean of the percentage voting for the Democratic presidential 
candidate between 1896 and 1928 in the city.  There is little likelihood of correlation between the 
Democratic loyalty measure and the unobservable error in the second-stage crime rate equation.  The 
Democratic presidential voting patterns are from a 32-year period that ended two years before the first 
year in our sample, thus eliminating any contemporaneous correlation.  Further, we have controlled for a   15 
variety of measures of income and distributions of income that would be the primary channels through 
which the Democratic vote for president would have been correlated with the error term in the crime rate 
equation.    
The second part of the interaction term is designed to capture the fact that the primary driver of 
the changes in total relief spending across time was the amount of federal money distributed across the 
country, but avoiding the possibility of correlation with the city’s error term.  Therefore, we developed a 
proxy for the changes in national per capita relief spending for city i in year t that is the total per capita 
spending for a group of cities outside the region where city i is located that also were not included in the 
estimation sample because of the lack of crime information.  By choosing cities outside the sample and 
outside city i’s region, the possibility of cross-correlations with city i in this portion of the instrument is 
reduced.
16  There was no national budget limit that served as a binding constraint on total relief spending, 
as the Roosevelt administration often drew additional funds from Congress throughout the New Deal, and 
budget deficits as a percentage of GDP were much lower than they are today.       
A second instrument is the number of months of “extreme” wetness in each city in each year.  
The measure is based on the Palmer Drought Severity Index, which ranges from -6 to +6.  Periods of 
extreme wetness are associated with values above 4.   The purpose of the instrument is to capture extreme 
periods when the rainfall was so strong that it brought work relief projects to a halt in ways that could not 
have been offset during the rest of the year.  The projects generally were able to operate under a broad 
range of normal rainfall conditions.  When the rainfall hit extreme levels, however, the outdoor projects 
were halted.  Given that there were limits on how many hours relief workers could work each month, it 
was not easy to make up the lost time during the rest of the year.  Approximately 6 percent of the city-
years in the sample experienced a period of extreme wetness, in some cases as many as 3 to 5 months of 
extreme wetness.  A question still remains as to whether such heavy rainfall might have influenced crime 
rates as well.  It has been documented that rainfall and temperature can influence crime and we have 
already included measures of average rainfall and temperature over the year to capture these effects in the   16 
second-stage crime regressions.  We see no reason, a priori, that extreme rainfall will have an additional 
effect on the crime rate after controlling for the continuous measures of average rainfall.  
Since there is no way to measure the unobservable error in the second-stage crime regression, we 
can never know for certain that our instruments are uncorrelated with the true error.  We can at least 
examine whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the estimated error from the IV analysis using 
standard over-identification tests.  The results of Hansen j-tests are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
identifying instruments have not been inappropriately omitted from the second-stage crime equation using 
20 percent as the rejection level.   
As seen in Table 5, the coefficient of the interaction between national relief spending and the 
Democratic loyalty measure is negative with a t-statistic of -7.44 in the first-stage relief equation.  The 
political economy studies of New Deal spending generally find a mixed set of results for the loyalty 
variable, suggesting that long-term Democratic support was generally not rewarded.  These results are 
more strongly negative, but they are also one of the few sets of results that examine the situation in a 
panel setting.  Meanwhile, the extreme wetness coefficient estimate, as expected, is negative with a t-
statistics of -3.26 in the first-stage spending equation.  The F-statistic for the hypothesis that the 
identifying instruments both have zero coefficients is 30.95 in the first-stage relief equation.  The 
Kleibergen-Papp Wald rank statistic of 30.95 (an adjusted version of the Cragg-Donald statistic when 
errors are robustly estimated) exceeds Stock and Yogo’s critical value of 19.93.  The comparison implies 
that if one is willing to accept a maximal weak instrument bias of 10 percent, the hypothesis of weak 
instrument bias is rejected.
17     
Comparisons of the IV coefficient estimates in Table 6 with the estimates in Table 2 do not show 
a clear pattern.  The IV relief coefficient estimates in the overall property crime, burglary, robbery, 
murder, and aggravated assault equations are more negative than the Table 2 coefficients, but the IV 
estimates are less negative for larcenies and auto thefts.  We did not report IV estimates for the balanced 
panel property crimes and the rapes due to weak instrument problems.  The IV coefficient estimates are 
generally less precisely estimated, and only the aggravated assaults and burglary estimates are statistically   17 
significant.  This raises the question as to whether there are endogeneity or simultaneity biases in the 
coefficients in Table 2.   When we perform the standard Hausman test for endogeneity, which only is 
meaningful if the identifying instruments are strong and are uncorrelated with the true error in the crime 
rate equation, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no endogeneity in all but the aggravated assault analysis.      
To perform IV analysis for the distinct effects of direct and work relief spending, we used a 
similar strategy.  The instruments include the extreme wetness measure and two interaction terms.  Each 
uses the cross-sectional Democratic loyalty measure as part of the interaction.  The loyalty term is then 
interacted with the changes in work relief spending from outside the sample and outside the region where 
city i is located to create an instrument for work relief spending.  For direct relief the loyalty term is 
interacted with the changes in direct relief spending outside city i’s region and outside the sample.  
To effectively identify the distinct effects of work relief and direct relief, it is important that the 
identifying instruments have different relationships with work relief than they do with direct relief.  As 
seen in Table 5, the coefficient for the work relief/loyalty interaction term is negative with a t-value of  
-7.61 in the work relief equation and positive in the direct relief equation.  Similarly, the coefficient for 
the direct relief/loyalty interaction term is negative with a t-value of -5.59 in the direct relief equation and 
positive in the direct relief equation.  The severe wetness measure is negative and statistically significant 
in only the work relief first-stage, which is expected because severe weather would have only affected 
work relief opportunities and not direct relief.  The F-statistics for the two first-stage equations are 21.54 
and 11.11.  The Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F-statistics of 11 exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical value for 
15 percent maximal weak instrument bias of 8.18.  The Hansen j-statistic p-value is 0.946, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the estimated errors in the final 
stage crime equation. 
Comparisons of the results in Tables 3 and 7 show the same pattern that work relief spending had 
a more negative effect on most crime rates than did direct relief.  Except for aggravated assaults none of 
the direct relief coefficient estimates are statistically significant.  As was the case for the comparisons 
between the coefficient estimates in Tables 2 and 6, the comparisons of the IV coefficient estimates in   18 
Table 7 to the estimates in Table 3 show that the direction of the differences varies by crime.  The 
Hausman tests for endogeneity cannot reject the hypothesis that there was no endogeneity for each crime 
rate regression except for aggravated assaults.  We did not perform IV estimates for the three-way split of 
relief spending because we could not find instruments that were strong in each first-stage equation but not 
strong in the other equations to allow us to separately identify the effects of each type of relief.   
 
Other Correlates 
The coefficients for the other correlates in Table 5 offer some insights on the relationships 
between crime and other measures of economic activity.  Economic theory predicts that increased 
employment opportunities would have reduced crime by raising legal incomes and thus increasing the 
opportunity cost of committing crime and also reducing the time available for criminal activity.  Steven 
Raphael and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer (2001) found a significantly positive effect of unemployment on 
property crime rates in more recent decades.  Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard 
(2002) found that the unemployment rate and wages of unskilled men played a significant role in crime 
trends between 1979 and 1997.  Increased retail sales, a strong proxy for income, potentially have 
conflicting effects.  They might reduce crime by raising the incomes of legal alternatives to crime, but 
crime might be increased to the extent that the rewards from crime are raised by the availability of targets 
with higher incomes.   Another measure of this potential “loot effect” is the number of tax returns per 
capita, which captures the share of the population with incomes that would put them in the top 5-10 
percent of the U.S. population in the 1930s.  
The coefficient estimates of the state employment index in Table 5 are negative and statistically 
significant, as predicted.  The coefficients in the property crime regressions are roughly -16, which imply 
elasticities of roughly -1.00.  The one-standard-deviation effects suggest that a one-standard deviation 
improvement in state employment rates was associated with a 0.253 standard deviation reduction in crime 
rates.  The one-standard-deviation effect is roughly similar in size to one-standand-deviation effects of 
0.13 to 0.424 for the relationship between unemployment rates and property crime rates that we have   19 
calculated from Raphael and Winter-Ebmer’s  (2001) estimates from a panel of American states from 
1976 to 1997.
18   
The effect of higher incomes on crime rates are not strong in this sample.  The coefficient 
estimates for the share of high-income people – tax returns per capita – are negative, but the elasticity of  
-0.0465 is small and the coefficient is not statistically insignificant.   Meanwhile, the coefficients for retail 
sales per capita are very small and not statistically significant.   There is some evidence that more poverty 
is associated with higher property crime rates because the coefficient of infant mortality, which is 
associated with poverty, is positive, although statistically significant only in the IV regressions.  The 
coefficient estimate implies an elasticity of 0.25.     
The relationship between crime rates and police spending per capita was positive, although only 
statistically significant in the instrumental variable regressions.  The positive relationship was likely 




V.  Conclusion  
The economic downturn associated with the Great Depression pushed millions of American 
workers and their families into personal economic crises.  With legal employment opportunities 
significantly limited by the Depression, some families who faced desperate circumstances for the first 
time likely turned to illegal means for subsistence.  The unprecedented relief spending accompanying the 
New Deal helped alleviate distress by providing work and income opportunities for the unemployed.  One 
salutary effect of the expansion in relief programs was a reduction in the crime rate.  Our empirical 
analysis suggests that New Deal relief lowered property crime in a statistically and economically 
significant way.  The estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in per capita relief spending during the 
Great Depression was associated with a 1.5 percent reduction in property crime rates.   
Work relief was a prominent feature of Depression era relief, although it is relatively uncommon 
today.  Economic theory suggests that the reduction of free time associated with work relief would have   20 
made it more effective at reducing crime rates than relief payments without a work requirement.  The 
results here are consistent with this prediction, as the bulk of the effect of total per capita relief spending 
on reducing crimes can be attributed to the work relief component.    
At various times in the history of American welfare policy, there have been claims that relief 
provided by private organizations had more salutary effects than did government-run relief because the 
private organizations did more to “build character” among the recipients.  The results for the major cities 
in the 1930s show relatively small and statistically significant elasticities of crime rates with respect to 
privately administered relief.   
It appears that Roosevelt’s intuition expressed in his 1939 speech, quoted at the beginning of the 
paper, was accurate.  New Deal relief spending, so carefully targeted at the lower end of the income 
distribution during a major economic crisis, appears to have “struck at the very roots of crime” during the 
1930s.  The results in this paper add to a list of beneficial effects associated with New Deal spending on 
public works and relief.   Other recent studies suggest that relief expenditures were associated with lower 
infant mortality, fewer suicides, fewer deaths from some forms of disease, higher birth rates, more in-
migration, and expansions in economic activity.
20 
More generally, our results indicate that social insurance, which tends to be understudied in the economic 
analyses of crime, should be more explicitly and more carefully incorporated into the analysis of temporal 
and spatial variations in criminal activity.  Our results offer limited insight into the modern worries about 
a culture of poverty and crime associated with expansions in the generosity of long-term welfare 
programs.  After all, the Great Depression was a major crisis that led to the introduction of many of the 
features of the modern welfare system.  The New Deal experience says much more about the impact of 
social insurance in settings where people are confronted with an extraordinary economic misfortune.  Our 
results suggest that for such people who are suddenly faced with greater temptation to steal, the 
availability of social insurance helps tilt the balance in favor of lawful behavior.   21 
FOOTNOTES 
 
1 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Address at the National Parole Conference,” Washington, DC, April 17, 
1939.  Accessible at The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu. 
2 When identifying the effect of unemployment on crime, Cook and Zarkin (1985) point out that 
there are a number of omitted variables that may vary with the business cycle that might affect crime, yet 
are not always easily included in empirical studies of crime.  The factors that can lead to omitted-variable 
bias include measures of legitimate employment opportunities, the presence of criminal opportunities, the 
consumption of drugs, alcohol, or guns, and the quantity and effectiveness of the police and criminal 
justice system. 
3 In two recent articles that provide a survey of the crime literature from an economics 
perspective (Witte and Witt 2001 and Levitt 2004), social insurance was ignored as a potential 
determinant of international or temporal variations in crime.  Some notable exceptions in the literature 
include Zhang (1997), which is one of the only studies in economics to explicitly model and empirically 
measure the impact of welfare payments.  He found that public housing assistance had much greater 
effects on crime reduction than such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, or 
the school lunch program.  However, Zhang estimated the model on a cross-section of states for the year 
1987 and thus could not employ any of the panel data techniques used to control for a wide range of 
omitted variables.  Hashimoto (1987) examines the link between increases in the minimum wage with 
teenage crime.  Hansen and Machin (2002) explore the effect of the minimum wage in the UK and find 
that areas that had relatively more low-wage workers who benefited from the minimum wage floor 
experienced reduced crime.  Lochner and Moretti (2004) and Lochner (2004) explore the link between 
educational attainment and skill level and crime.  They find significant social returns to programs that 
contribute to educational attainment.  Donohue and Siegelman (1998) consider the counterfactual case of 
reallocating money away from prisons and into targeted preschool programs.  They contend that crime 
could be reduced without greater social spending if large-scale increases in prison expenditures were 
   22 
 
diverted to preschool interventions.  Finally, in terms of other types of social policy that may influence 
crime, see Donahue and Levitt (2001) who argue that legalized abortion may account for up to 50 percent 
of the recent drop in crime. 
Sociologists have taken up the question of how welfare influences crime, but, like economists, 
have not delved deeply into the question.  See DeFronzo (1983), Devine, Sheley, and Smith (1988), and 
Hannon and DeFronzo (1998) for empirical studies of the link between public assistance and crime.   
4 See Winslow (1937), Baird (1942), Skocpol (1992, ch. 2), Clark, Craig, and Wilson (2003), and 
Fishback and Thomasson (2006, 2:709). 
5 For an empirical analysis of the distribution of FERA grants, see Fleck (1999b) and Fishback, 
Kantor and Wallis (2003).  For discussions of the administrative details of relief provision, see Brown 
(1940), Howard (1943), and U.S. National Resources Planning Board (1942). 
6 Our relief measure includes some privately administered relief spending, which accounted for 
roughly one-quarter of relief spending prior to 1933, but less than one percent thereafter.  Privately 
administered relief in many cases came from government sources.  More detailed breakdowns for urban 
areas can be found in Baird (1942).  Several programs that might be considered public assistance were not 
included in the reported relief data.  For example, FERA emergency education, student aid, the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC), the National Youth Administration, and transient programs were omitted.  
Pandiani (1982) argues that the CCC potentially contributed significantly to crime reduction in cities 
because the program targeted poor young men.  We have not found city-level information on the CCC but 
we have explored including per capita state-level information on the CCC in the work relief spending 
variable.  We have also explored adding state information on earnings under the Public Works 
Administration (PWA), which tended to hire more skilled workers.  Including spending per capita in these 
programs – 60 cents from the PWA and 40 cents from the CCC (1935$) – leads to qualitative results that 
are generally the same as those reported below.    
7 For discussions of the FERA and CWA policies, see Brown (1940, 218-98) and U.S. National 
   23 
 
Resources Planning Board (1942, 26-97). 
8Burglary is defined as the “unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft.”  Larceny-
theft is the “unlawful taking . . . of property from possession . . . of another . . . in which no use of force, 
violence, or fraud occurs.”  Motor vehicle theft is self-explanatory. 
9 See Zhang (1997) for an explicit theoretical model of how welfare payments influence the 
decision to commit crime.  Grogger (1998) provides a theoretical analysis of the incentive effects of 
wages on criminal behavior.  Whether we view New Deal relief as an income supplement or as a means 
of raising reservation wages of individuals, the theoretical models predict the same outcome:  relief 
should diminish the incentive to commit property crime. 
10 See, for example, Field (1992), Cohn and Rotton (2000), Rotton and Cohn (2003), and Simister 
and Cooper (2005). 
11 Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman  (1996) find that there is high variance across cities in 
crime rates and that much of the variance is explained by social interactions. 
12 As an alternative to the city-specific time trends, we have estimated the model with time trends 
for demographic changes by including a series of variables that have values from the 1930 and 1940 
Census and are interpolated between Census years on a straight-line.  The variables we incorporated 
included percent foreign-born, percent black, percent illiterate, and the percent aged 10 to 34.  The city-
specific time trends approach is a more flexible means of controlling for such trends and an Oaxaca-
Geissler (2003, 376) F-test suggests that the city-specific time trends control for more factors than do the 
interpolated demographic variables.  None of the estimated coefficients for the demographic variables 
were statistically significantly different from zero. 
13 Fishback, Haines and Kantor (2007) had information on homicides and suicides from 
the Bureau of the Census volumes on Mortality Statistics, an alternative source to the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reports.  Their estimates suggest that expenditures of approximately $29 million 
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(2000$) were associated with eliminating a homicide and $13 million associated with eliminating 
a suicide. 
14 See Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) for labor theoretic analysis of the effects of work 
opportunities and non-labor income on crime that are directly applicable to the predicted effects of work 
relief and direct relief. 
15 See Ziliak (1997) for an extended discussion of the past and modern versions of this argument 
and for an empirical test of the success of the shift from public to private charity through the Charity 
Organization Society in the late 1800s. 
16 There were 31 cities for which we had relief spending information but are not included in the 
sample because of a lack of crime data. We have also performed the estimation using the per capita relief 
spending in all cities in the sample outside the region of city i, and the basic results are the same. 
17 See Stock and Yogo (2002), Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and 
Kleibergen (forthcoming). 
18 Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) estimated a model with the natural log of the property crime 
rate per 100,000 as a function of the unemployment rate.  The standard deviation for the unemployment 
rate was .02 and for the property crime rate was 1158.20 and the coefficients in Table 2 ranged from 1.6 
to 5.  We calculated the one-standard-deviation effect by starting with the antilog of their sample mean for 
the crime rate at 4674.81, which equals 8.4494.  Multiplying the coefficient (1.6) times the standard 
deviation of the unemployment rate (.02) gave a value of 0.0469, which was added to 8.4494 to get 
8.49684.  We then took the anti-log to get the change in the crime rate of 224.47, which is 0.1938 
standard deviations.      
19For the results of IV analysis of the impact of police activity on modern crime rates, see Levitt 
(1997, 2002) and McCrary (2002).    
20 See Fishback, Haines, and Kantor (2007) and Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005 and 2006).   25 
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Table 1 
 























1930  9.0  $1.54     
1931  16.3  $3.72     
1932  24.1  $7.42    2.1% 
1933  25.2  $12.21  0.217  51.8 
1934  22.0  $19.70  0.312  78.9 
1935  20.3  $20.97  0.333  78.9 
1936  17.0  $25.39  0.424  74.7 
1937  14.3  $21.47  0.376  72.1 
1938  19.1  $28.61  0.393  62.0 
1939  17.2  $26.02  0.383  62.5 
1940  14.6  $21.75  0.349  57.4 
 
Notes:  Per capita relief spending represents a population-weighted average for 114 cities.  Relief per 
capita is the total of all direct relief, work relief and private relief funds.  Direct relief includes direct 
relief under the FERA, by state and local governments, and categorical assistance for dependent children, 
old-age assistance, and aid to the blind.  Prior to 1935 the categorical assistance categories refer to funds 
provided by state and local governments through mothers’ pensions, old-age pensions, and state aid to the 
blind.  Work relief includes payments to workers on state and local government, FERA, CWA, and WPA 
projects.  Private relief is the value of relief funds from private and public sources administered by private 
agencies.  Average annual relief benefits were calculated as the ratio of total relief expenditures per 
number of households on relief. The data source reported the information monthly and we summed across 
months for the annual estimate.  The 1940 data were only reported through June, so we doubled the 
amount reported to derive the annual estimate.  We do not have information on the federal share of relief 
prior to 1932, but it was probably similar to 1932’s value.  The federal share of relief information 
includes the cost of administering the programs.  The 1932 federal figure includes $3.7 million in federal 
workers’ compensation payments.  The state and local expenditures include workers’ compensation, 
general relief, old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, aid to the blind, and state shares of 
unemployment compensation, WPA, CWA, and the National Youth Administration.   
 
Sources:  Relief spending data are reported in Baird (1942) and Winslow (1937).  Population data are 
from Haines and ICPSR (2005).  Linear interpolation was used to estimate population for years between 
1930 and 1940 censuses.  For federal share of relief spending, see U.S. National Resources Planning 
Board (1942, 292, 598-603).  Average relief expenditures per household were calculated from data on 
households receiving relief and total expenditures on relief in U.S. National Resources Planning Board 
(1942, 557-61).   Average annual manufacturing earnings are from U.S. Bureau of the Census Bureau 
(1975, 166).  Unemployment rates for the entire United States are calculated from Series Ba470, Ba474, 
and Ba477 in Carter, et. al. (2006, 2:82-83).  Federal emergency relief workers were included as 
unemployed in this calculation.   Per capita relief spending was adjusted to 1935 dollars by using the   29 
Consumer Price Index with 1967 as the base year in series E-135 in Bureau of Census (1975, 210-1) to 
adjust the dollars to 1967 values and then multiplying by .411 the value of the CPI in 1935. 
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Table 2 
OLS Results for Per Capita Relief Spending Variable in Crime Rate Equations 
 
Dollars of relief needed to 
prevent one crime 
Estimation (dep. 
var. is crime rate 
per 100,000 
people) 
Coeff.    
t-stat. 
Elast.  OSD 
2000 $  1935 $ 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
 
     
-13.478  -0.153  -0.194  $94,082  $7,420  Property Crimes –
No Correlates  -3.5         




-2.78         
CORRELATES AND CITY FIXED EFFECTS, YEAR EFFECTS AND CITY 
TRENDS INCLUDED 
 
-13.584  -0.154  -0.195  $93,346  $7,362  Property Crimes 
-2.29         
-19.130  -0.217  -0.275  $66,283  $5,227  Property Crimes--
Balanced Panel
a  -2.61         
-7.473  -0.132  -0.148  $169,678  $13,382  Larcenies 
-1.88         
-5.594  -0.212  -0.244  $226,657  $17,875  Burglaries 
-2.48         
-0.493  -0.103  -0.076  $2,570,877  $202,751  Robberies 
-1.13         
-2.880  -0.149  -0.172  $440,336  $34,727  Auto Thefts 
-1.71         
-0.063  -0.135  -0.076  $20,162,855  $1,590,131  Murders 
-1.39         
-1.763  -0.499  -0.192  $719,236  $56,722  Aggravated 
Assaults  -1.06         
0.047  0.123  0.083  NA
b  NA
b  Rapes 
0.34             
 
a A listing of the cities in the balanced panel and unbalanced panels is reported in Appendix Table 1.   
b NA means not applicable because coefficient estimate is positive.   31 
Notes:  Each row represents a different estimation specification.  Property crimes are the sum of larcenies, 
robberies, burglaries, and auto thefts.  The dependent variables are crimes per 100,000 people.  White-
corrected standard errors clustered by city are in italics below each coefficient.   The fixed effects 
estimates for the property crime regression are reported in Table 5. The elasticity is calculated at the mean 
of the sample.  The OSD is the number of standard deviations by which the crime rate changes with an 
increase of one standard deviation of per capita relief spending.  All specifications except the first row 
regression include the following correlates:  per capita police spending, a state employment index, per 
capita retail sales in the county where the city is located, per capita tax returns in the county, an indicator 
for the elimination of the prohibition of alcohol at the local level, average precipitation for the year, 
average daily temperature, general fertility rate, and the infant mortality rate.  All monetary values are 
expressed in constant 1935 dollars.  All fixed effects and city-specific time trend regressions include 
dummy variables for all cities but the excluded city (Bridgeport, CT), time trends for all cities, dummy 
variables for all years except the excluded year 1930.  The number of observations is 780 for property 
crimes and larcenies, 781 for robberies, burglaries, and auto thefts, 779 for murders, 780 for aggregated 
assaults, and 463 for rapes.  Rape information was not reported after 1936.   
 
Sources:  For the sources of the relief spending data, see Table 1.  Relief per capita is the total of all direct 
relief, work relief and private relief funds.  The crime data were collected from the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (various years).  The state employment index is from Wallis (1989) and the demographic 
data are from Haines and ICPSR (2005).  Police spending was collected from U.S. Bureau of Census, 
Financial Statistics (various years). We were able to collect retail sales information for the counties in 
which the cities were located for 1929, 1933, 1935, and 1939.  Retail sales from 1929 and 1939 are from 
the amended ICPSR file and retail sales for 1933 and 1935 are from U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (1936, 1939).  The population estimate used to create the per 
capita measure was based on straight-line interpolations between 1920, 1930, and 1940 data from Haines 
and ICPSR (2005).  We interpolated values of per capita retail sales in the intervening years using 
estimates of state personal income from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1989).  For each year 
between 1930 and 1940, we divided state personal income by an estimate of state population.  Then to 
interpolate per capita retail sales between the benchmark years of 1929, 1933, 1935, and 1939, we used a 
formula such as the following for 1931:  R31 = R29 + (R33 – R29)*(S31 – S29)/(S33 – S29), where R is per 
capita retail sales in the appropriate year for the county in which the city was located and S is per capita 
state personal income in the same year.  Fertility and infant mortality data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Birth, Stillbirth and Infant Mortality Statistics (various years) and in data sets used by Fishback, 
Haines, and Kantor (2007), available at http://economics.eller.arizona.edu/faculty/Fishback.aspx.  
Rainfall and temperature data are from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDR).  Text files of the data 
were accessed from ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/cirs/ (August 2003).  The NCDR reports historical 
monthly data by climate division within each state, so each city’s climate information pertains to its 
respective climate division.  If a city was located within two or more divisions, climate information was 
calculated as the average across the climate divisions in which the city was located.   Koleman Strumpf 
provided gave us the information on the probability that the city had eliminated Prohibition (Strumpf and 
Oberholzer-Gee 2002).  The number of tax returns in 1930, 1933, 1937, 1938, and 1940 are respectively 
from the U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue (1932, 1935, 1939, 1940, and 1941); for 1931, 1932, 1935, 
1936, and 1940 are respectively from Rand McNally (1934, 1935, 1938, 1939, 1943); and for 1934 the 
source is U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (1939).  The relief 
spending, retail sales per capita, and police spending measures were adjusted to 1935 dollars by using the 
Consumer Price Index with 1967 as the base year in series E-135 in Bureau of Census (1975, 210-1) to 
adjust the dollars to 1967 values and then multiplying by .411 the value of the CPI in 1935.    
Year 1935 dollars can be roughly converted to year 2000 dollars by multiplying by 12.68. 
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Table 3 
Results for Per Capita Work Relief and Direct Relief Spending in Crime Rate Equations 
 
   Per Capita Work Relief Spending  Per Capita Direct Relief Spending 
  
Coeff.     









Coeff.     









-15.839  -0.099  -0.161  $80,054  $6,313  -5.990  -0.029  -0.041  $211,672  $16,693  Property Crimes 
-2.24          -0.91         
-18.609  -0.116  -0.189  $68,139  $5,374  -20.888  -0.102  -0.143  $60,704  $4,787  Property Crimes--
Balanced Panel  -2.26          -2.47         
-8.685  -0.084  -0.122  $145,996  $11,514  -3.406  -0.026  -0.032  $372,248  $29,357  Larcenies 
-1.86          -0.67         
-6.553  -0.137  -0.202  $193,497  $15,260  -2.352  -0.038  -0.049  $539,192  $42,523  Burglaries 
-2.56          -0.98         
-0.576  -0.066  -0.063  $2,200,937  $173,575  -0.216  -0.019  -0.016  $5,874,342  $463,276  Robberies 
-1.09          -0.32         
-3.186  -0.091  -0.135  $398,052  $31,392  -1.945  -0.043  -0.055  $651,854  $51,408  Auto Thefts 
-1.77          -0.87         
-0.090  -0.106  -0.077  $14,162,944  $1,116,951  0.028  0.026  0.016  NA
a   NA
a  Murders 
-1.71          0.46         
-1.871  -0.291  -0.144  $677,574  $53,436  -1.456  -0.177  -0.076  $870,596  $68,659  Aggravated 
Assaults  -0.96          -1.46         
0.043  0.062  0.053  NA
a   NA
a  0.035  0.040  0.030  NA
a   NA
a  Rapes 
0.25              0.22             
a NA means not applicable because coefficient estimate is positive. 
Notes and Sources:   See Table 2.  Work relief includes FERA work relief spending, WPA payments, and CWA payments.  Direct relief includes  
private relief, direct relief under the FERA, by state and local governments, and categorical assistance for dependent children, old-age assistance, 
and aid to the blind.  Each row represents results associated with an equation with the correlates listed in Table 5, city fixed effects, city time 
trends, and year fixed effects.   33 
 
Table 4 
Results for Per Capita Work Relief, Direct Relief, and Private Relief Spending in Crime Rate Equations 
  
Per Capita Work Relief 
Spending 
Per Capita Direct Relief 
Spending 
Per Capita Private Relief 
Spending 
  
Coeff.     
t-stat.  Elast.  OSD 
Coeff.     
t-stat.  Elast.  OSD 
Coeff.     
t-stat.  Elast.  OSD 
-15.842  -0.099  -0.161  -5.933  -0.003  -0.041  -20.962  -0.005  -0.013  Property Crimes 
-2.24      -0.90      -0.59     
-18.544  -0.116  -0.188  -20.700  -0.005  -0.142  -31.060  -0.007  -0.019  Property Crimes--
Balanced Panel  -2.27      -2.44      -0.97     
-8.686  -0.084  -0.122  -3.386  -0.003  -0.032  -8.658  -0.003  -0.007  Larcenies 
-1.86      -0.67      -0.42     
-6.554  -0.137  -0.202  -2.317  -0.008  -0.048  -11.183  -0.009  -0.021  Burglaries 
-2.56      -0.98      -0.51     
-0.576  -0.066  -0.063  -0.214  -0.018  -0.016  -0.651  -0.003  -0.004  Robberies 
-1.09      -0.32      -0.20     
-3.184  -0.091  -0.135  -2.010  0.028  -0.057  14.536  0.015  0.037  Auto Thefts 
-1.78      -0.90      1.25     
-0.090  -0.106  -0.077  0.030  -1.701  0.018  -0.577  -0.025  -0.030  Murders 
-1.73      0.49      -1.84     
-1.871  -0.291  -0.144  -1.457  -0.045  -0.076  -1.417  -0.008  -0.007  Aggravated 
Assaults  -0.96      -1.46      -0.37     
0.036  0.052  0.045  0.025  1.220  0.021  0.557  0.030  0.042  Rapes 
0.21        0.15        1.08       
 
Notes and Sources:   See Table 2.  Work relief includes FERA work relief spending, WPA payments, and CWA payments.  Direct relief includes 
direct relief under the FERA, by state and local governments, and categorical assistance for dependent children, old-age assistance, and aid to the 
blind.  Private relief refers to relief administered by a wide range of nongovernment groups described in from Baird (1942, 6).  Each row 
represents results associated with an equation with the correlates listed in Table 5, city fixed effects, city time trends, and year fixed effects.   34 
Table 5 
Fixed Effects and First- and Second-Stage Instrumental Variable Coefficient Estimates and 
t-statistics with Property Crimes per 100,000 People as the Dependent Variable in the 
Crime Equation 
 



































Correlates  Coeff      
t-stat. 
Coeff      
t-stat. 
Coeff      
t-stat. 
Coeff      
t-stat. 
Coeff      
t-stat. 
Coeff      
t-stat. 
Coeff      
t-stat. 




-2.29  -1.41           




      -2.24  -1.30     




      -0.91  -0.60     
    -0.019          Loyalty/Relief 
Trend 
Interaction 
    -7.44         
    -0.789      -0.725  -0.065  Months of 
Extreme 
Wetness 
    -3.26      -3.30  -0.55 
          -0.021  0.002  Loyalty/Work 
Relief Trend 
Interaction 
          -7.61  1.77 
          0.000  -0.022  Loyalty/Direct 
Relief Trend 
Interaction 
          0.09  -5.59 




1.32  1.97  1.43  1.34  1.99  1.88  -0.41 
-15.977  -15.838  0.014  -16.055  -15.916  0.001  0.013  State 
Employment 
Index 
-1.76  -3.22  0.35  -1.76  -3.17  0.03  0.66 
Retail Sales  0.031  0.121  0.008  0.115  0.172  0.011  -0.002   35 
Per Capita 
(1935$) 
0.02  0.11  0.66  0.09  0.15  0.93  -0.27 
34.577  33.140  -0.224  31.346  30.589  -0.605  0.393  Avg. Monthly 
Precipitation  1.07  1.29  -0.80  0.96  1.14  -2.33  2.46 
10.377  11.905  0.195  12.731  13.597  0.285  -0.084  Avg. Daily 
Temperature  0.54  0.85  1.47  0.65  0.85  2.40  -1.02 
14.306  14.887  0.006  14.702  15.142  0.029  -0.023  General 
Fertility Rate  1.45  1.94  0.09  1.47  1.97  0.47  -0.63 
3.525  3.381  0.007  3.444  3.324  0.003  0.003  Infant 
Mortality Rate  1.16  1.70  0.35  1.13  1.64  0.13  0.22 
-45.251  -37.511  0.177  -52.045  -44.106  -0.556  0.732  Eliminated 
Prohibition 
Probability 
-0.22  -0.38  0.20  -0.26  -0.43  -0.77  1.45 
-4.533  -10.389  -0.431  -4.277  -9.684  -0.240  -0.200  Tax Returns 









  0.22  -1.18  -1.49  0.10  -1.21  -2.56  1.37 
City Fixed 
Effects 
Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
City Time 
Trends 
Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
N of 
observations 










! ! 30.95  ! ! 11.00 
Stock-Yogo 
Critical Value 
for % Bias 
! ! 19.93 for 
10% 
! ! 13.43 for 10% bias  
8.18 for 15 % bias 
Chi-squared p-
value for the 
Hansen J-
statistic 
    0.963        0.946   
 
Sources and Notes: See Table 2 
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Table 6 
Instrumental Variable Results for Relationship between Crime Rates 
and Per Capita Relief Spending 
 
Dependent 
Variable:       
Crimes per 100,000 
People 
Coeff.      











-19.636  -0.223  -0.282  $64,576  $5,093  Property Crimes 
-1.41         
-5.585  -0.063  -0.080  $227,031  $17,905  Larcenies 
-0.64         
-12.530  -0.142  -0.180  $101,196  $7,981  Burglaries 
-2.13         
-1.436  -0.025  -0.028  $882,928  $69,632  Robberies 
-1.46         
0.309  0.012  0.013  -$4,106,632  -$323,867  Auto Thefts 
0.09         
-0.178  -0.037  -0.027  $7,137,281  $562,877  Murders 
-1.57         
-9.495  -0.491  -0.568  $133,540  $10,532  Aggravated 




Sources and Notes.   See Table 2.   Each row represents an Instrumental Variable Estimation with the 
same correlates, fixed effects, and identifying instruments as in the estimation in Table 4.  The first-stage 
estimations and statistics are essentially the same for property crimes, larcenies, robberies, burglaries, 
auto thefts, murders, and aggravated assaults.  The Kliebergen-Paap Wald F-statistics exceeds 30.4  for 
the first stage estimations for the various crimes and therefore rejects the hypothesis of weak instrument 
bias if one is willing to accept a maximum of 10 percent weak instrument bias.  We did not report the rape 
estimates or the balanced panel estimates for property crimes because the hypothesis of weak instrument 
bias could not be rejected even if we were willing to accept 25 percent weak instrument bias.  The final-
stage equations’ p-values for the Chi-squared test of the Hansen J-statistic are 0.54 for property crimes, 
0.65 for larcenies, 0.58 for robberies, 0.77 for burglaries, 0.87 for auto thefts, 0.77 for murders, 0.707 for 
aggravated assaults, 0.18 for rapes, and 0.46 for the unbalanced panel of property crimes.  




Instrumental Variable Results for Relationship of Crime Rates 
 with Per Capita Work Relief and Direct Relief Spending  
 
   Per Capita Work Relief Spending  Per Capita Direct Relief Spending 
Dependent Variable:       
Crimes per 100,000 
People 
Coeff.     









Coeff.     









Property Crimes  -20.881  -0.130  -0.212  $60,725  $4,789  -12.779  -0.062  -0.087  $99,222  $7,825 
  -1.3          -0.6         
Larcenies  -5.705  -0.055  -0.080  $222,247  $17,527  -4.802  -0.036  -0.045  $264,058  $20,825 
  -0.57          -0.3         
Burglaries  -13.554  -0.283  -0.418  $93,554  $7,378  -7.013  -0.114  -0.146  $180,808  $14,259 
  -2          -1.04         
Robberies  -1.538  -0.177  -0.168  $824,639  $65,035  -0.890  -0.080  -0.066  $1,424,619  $112,352 
  -1.42          -0.49         
Auto Thefts  1.166  0.033  0.049  NA
a  NA
a   -4.267  -0.095  -0.122  $297,154  $23,435 
  0.31          -0.84         
Murders  -0.224  -0.264  -0.191  $5,672,050  $447,323  0.074  0.068  0.042  NA
a  NA
a  
  -1.78          0.3         
Aggravated Assaults  -9.256  -1.440  -0.714  $136,993  $10,804  -10.694  -1.300  -0.555  $118,566  $9,351 
  -1.53          -2.48         
 
aNot applicable because positive sign means no reduction associated with spending more. 
  
Sources and Notes.   See Table 2.   Each row represents an Instrumental Variable Estimation with the same correlates, fixed effects, and 
identifying instruments as in the estimations for per capita work relief and direct relief spending in Table 4.  The first-stage estimations and 
statistics are virtually the same for property crimes, larcenies, robberies, burglaries, auto thefts, murders, and aggravated assaults.  The Kliebergen-
Paap Wald F-statistics exceeds 10.6  for the first stage estimations for the various crimes and therefore rejects the hypothesis of weak instrument   38 
bias if one is willing to accept a maximum of 15 percent weak instrument bias.  We do not report estimations for rapes and for the balanced panel 
estimations for property crimes because of weak instrument problems.  In neither case did the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F-statistic reject the 
hypothesis of a weak instrument bias if one is willing to accept a maximum of  25 percent weak instrument bias.  The final-stage equations’ p-
values for the Chi-squared test of the Hansen J-statistic are 0.95 for property crimes, 0.54 for larcenies, 0.59 for robberies, 0.43 for burglaries, 0.83 
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Appendix Table 1 
 
List of 81 Cities in the Sample 
 
Akron, OH*   Grand Rapids, MI*   Pittsburgh, PA 
Albany, NY*   Hartford, CT*  Portland, OR 
Atlanta, GA  Houston, TX  Providence, RI* 
Baltimore, MD*   Indianapolis, IN  Reading, PA 
Birmingham, AL*   Jacksonville, FL  Richmond, VA*  
Boston, MA  Jersey City, NJ  Rochester, NY*  
Bridgeport, CT*   Kansas City, KS  Salt Lake City, UT*  
Buffalo, NY  Kansas City, MO  San Antonio, TX  
Cambridge, MA*   Knoxville, TN*   San Diego, CA 
Canton, OH*   Los Angeles, CA  San Francisco, CA 
Chicago, IL  Louisville, KY  Scranton, PA*  
Cincinnati, OH*   Lowell, MA*   Seattle, WA 
Cleveland, OH*  Lynn, MA  South Bend, IN 
Columbus, OH*  Memphis, TN  Springfield, MA*  
Dallas, TX  Miami, FL  St. Louis, MO 
Dayton, OH*  Milwaukee, WI  St. Paul, MN 
Denver, CO  Minneapolis, MN  Syracuse, NY 
Des Moines, IA  Nashville, TN*   Tacoma, WA 
Detroit, MI*  New Bedford, MA  Toledo, OH 
Duluth, MN  New Haven, CT  Trenton, NJ 
El Paso, TX  New Orleans, LA*   Tulsa, OK 
Erie, PA*  New York, NY  Utica, NY*  
Evansville, IN  Newark, NJ  Wichita, KS*  
Fall River, MA*  Norfolk, VA  Wilmington, DE*  
Flint, MI*  Oakland, CA*   Worcester, MA*  
Fort Wayne, IN  Omaha, NE*   Yonkers, NY 
Fort Worth, TX   Philadelphia, PA*  Youngstown, OH*  
 
* Indicates cities which are included in the balanced panel of the dataset.  40 
Appendix Table 2 
 
Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 
Variable  N  Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
CRIMES PER 100,000 People       
Property Crimes  780  1440.47  723.40 
Larceny  780  929.46  525.48 
Burglaries  780  431.15  238.38 
Robberies  780  78.20  67.21 
Auto Thefts  780  316.36  173.74 
Murders  778  7.61  8.59 
Aggrevate Assaults  779  57.82  95.31 
Rape  464  6.22  5.89 
RELIEF SPENDING PER CAPITA       
All Relief (1935$)  780  16.36  10.40 
Work Relief (1935$)  780  9.00  7.36 
Direct Relief (1935$)  780  7.36  4.94 
Public Direct Relief (1935$)  780  7.03  4.95 
Private Relief (1935$)  780  0.33  0.45 
CORRELATES       
Per Capita Police Spending (1935$)  780  3.43  1.48 
State Employment Index (1929=100)  780  90.37  11.45 
Retail Sales Per Capita (1935$)  780  351.26  76.89 
Average Monthly Precipitation   780  3.18  1.04 
Average Daily Temperature (Adjusted-for-Time-of-
Day)  780  52.52  6.97 
General Fertility Rate  780  63.01  9.63 
Infant Mortality Rate  780  51.55  14.38 
Probability Eliminated Prohibition  780  0.60  0.46 
Tax Returns Per Capita  780  6.44  3.70 
IDENTIFYING INSTRUMENTS       
Loyalty/Relief Trend Interaction  780  586.90  373.15 
Loyalty/Work Relief Trend Interaction  780  336.68  264.48 
Loyalty/Direct Relief Trend Interaction  780  250.21  135.85 
Months of Extreme Wetness  780  0.10  0.49 
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Figure 1 
 
Difference-in-Difference Plot of Change in Crime and Relief Between 1930-1932 and 1933-1940 
 
 